How does partisan regulation of political markets affect elections? We investigate how the partisan control of ballot format, which is expressly regulated -often to the apparent advantage of incumbents and major parties -in all U.S. states, affects voting. Through the analysis of a unique natural experiment, we focus specifically on the longstanding question of whether the name order of candidates on ballots affects election outcomes. Since 1975, California law has mandated randomizing the ballot order with a lottery. Previous studies, relying overwhelmingly on observational data, have yielded largely conflicting results. Using improved statistical methods, our analysis of statewide elections from 1978 to 2002 reveals that ballot order might have changed the winner in twelve percent of all primary races, including major and minor party races. We propose that all electoral jurisdictions should randomize ballot order to minimize ballot effects, and show that randomization may be substantially more cost-effective at reducing voting bias than currently proposed voting technology reforms. * We thank
Introduction
For decades, scholars have attempted to assess the effects of ballot forms on elections, an effort that has intensified since the election debacles of Bush v. Gore. Ballot reform bears significant policy implications, with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 authorizing almost 4 billion dollars to reform efforts. One particular research agenda, spanning five decades and dozens of books and articles, examines the causal effect of name order on ballots. Scholars worry that particular rules of election administration may have major unintended, or possibly intended, consequences on election outcomes. Although some have claimed that candidates listed earlier on the ballot gain more votes solely because of ballot position, previous studies have yielded conflicting results about whether ballot order effects even exist.
The source of the disagreement may well be methodological. While scholars who assert large ballot order effects rely on observational data, where name order is not randomized and possibly confounded, studies finding no effect have often used laboratory experiments that may lack external validity. To overcome these difficulties, we analyze a unique randomized natural experiment conducted in California statewide elections from 1978 to 2002. Since 1975, California elections law has mandated that the ballot order for statewide offices be physically randomized -after being "shaken vigorously," alphabet letters would be drawn from a lottery container to determine the order of candidates (Cal. Elec. Code § 13112(c) (2003) ). The California alphabet lottery therefore offers a series of ideal natural experiments that allow us to test ballot order effects for varying types of candidates and offices in actual elections.
Examining a total of 473 candidates in 80 races from 13 general elections and 8 primary elections, we find that in general elections, ballot order substantially impacts minor party candidates, while having inconclusive effects on major party candidates. In primaries, on the other hand, being listed first significantly increases the vote share for any candidate: major party candidates generally gain two percentage points of the total party vote, while minor party candidates may increase their vote shares by fifty percent of their baseline vote. In fact, primary effects are so substantial that ballot order might have changed the winner in as many as twelve percent of all primary races examined. In general elections, we find the largest effect for nonpartisan races where candidates in first position gain two percentage points on average. In contrast, we observe little difference in estimated causal effects of ballot order between types of offices for general elections, although effects appear to be somewhat larger for major offices in primaries. Our results are largely consistent with a theory of partisan cuing, where party labels convey information to uninformed voters (e.g., Schaffner and 1 Streb, 2002; Snyder and Ting, 2002) . When party labels are not available, as in nonpartisan races, or not informative, as in party primaries, voter decisions are most likely to be influenced by the ballot order.
Our research also pertains to several other important scholarly literatures, in particular in light of the fact that in the vast majority of U.S. states legislatures have mandated that major party candidates or incumbents be listed first. First, election law scholars have noted the perverse effects of partisan regulation of electoral administration and resulting role for judicial review (e.g., Issacharoff, Pildes and Karlan, 2001; Issacharoff and Pildes, 1998; Hasen, 1997) . Our case study demonstrates so-called "partisan lockups," the drafting of election rules that are anti-competitive in nature, in the context of the most basic building block of democracies: election ballots. Second, behavioral research has also begun to recognize the ability of decisionmakers to capitalize on cognitive biases (e.g., Rabin, 1998; Levitt, 2004; Druckman, 2001) . Our findings suggest that ballot format laws that do not randomize are far from innocuous. As has been recognized in several other markets, incumbents and major parties appear to have stacked electoral rules of the political market, in what might appear to be nominally fair terms, to exploit voter cognitive biases to entrench themselves in office. In addition to this positive analysis, our work adds a detailed case study from a prescriptive perspective as to how law can help to produce unbiased results in social choice by eliminating the impact of cognitive biases of individual actors via what we show to be cost-effective randomization (Garrett, 1999; Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, 1998; Sunstein, 2000) .
A third literature to which our research pertains is the work in statistics and econometrics on the identification of causal effects, which remains the key inferential problem that pervades the ballot regulation literature (Heckman et al., 1998; Rosenbaum, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . Randomized natural experiments such as the California alphabet lottery provide an exceptional opportunity for social scientists to draw credible causal inferences (Angrist, 1990; Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote, 2001; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000) . The main benefits of natural experiments are threefold. First, natural experiments permit the testing of causal effects with more credible and testable assumptions than conventional observational studies Imai and van Dyk, 2004) . Second, natural experiments take place in real settings, thereby maximizing external validity compared to laboratory experiments. Third, natural experiments are not constrained by practical, financial, and ethical constraints as are field experiments.
Capitalizing on the unique California experiment, we demonstrate widely applicable statistical techniques to formally test treatment randomization and to identify treatment effects.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background on ballot order effects and the morass of extant findings. Section 3 describes the California alphabet lottery and examines the crucial identification assumption that the resulting alphabets are indeed randomized.
In Section 4, we discuss methodological issues of estimating ballot order effects and present the results of our analysis. Section 5 spells out the policy implication for election law, namely that election officials in all states should randomize the ballot order to minimize ballot effects. The Section also provides evidence that randomization may be substantially more cost-effective at reducing voting bias than currently proposed electoral reforms. Section 6 concludes.
Elections and Ballot Order
Social scientists have rediscovered the importance of ballots since the days of counting chads in Florida (Niemi and Herrnson, 2003) . Recent studies have ranged from examining the causal effects of the butterfly ballot Wand et al., 2001) , forms of voting equipment (Tomz and Van Houweling, 2003) , partisan labels (Ansolabehere et al., 2003) , and the ballot order of candidates (Kimball and Kropf, 2003; Krosnick, Miller and Tichy, 2003; Koppell and Steen, 2004) .
Current interest in ballot order is rooted in a half century of research investigating the causal effect of the order in which candidates appear on ballots (e.g., Bain and Hecock, 1957; Darcy, 1986; Darcy and McAllister, 1990; Gold, 1952; Miller and Krosnick, 1998; Scott, 1972) . This research has spanned even beyond the United States, with studies in Australia (MacKerras, 1970) , Britain (Bagley, 1966) , Spain (Lijphart and Pintor, 1988) , and Ireland (Robson and Walsh, 1973) .
Beyond the academic literature, practical implications abound. Dozens of U.S. court decisions (e.g., Bradley v. Perrodin, 106 Cal. App. 4th 1153 , Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661 (1975); Mann v. Powell, 333 F. Supp. 1261 (1969 ) and the drafting of electoral statutes in all fifty states (e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3505.03 (Anderson 2003) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-10-8.1 (2003)) rely on a version of the claim that vote shares will accrue to a candidate solely for being listed first on the ballot. And, electoral jurisdictions, from town to city, and from province to country, have proposed "remedying" ballot order effects by instituting some form of rotation or randomization. 1
At heart in these reform efforts lies the empirical claim of ballot order effects.
Scholars have also developed theoretical propositions about ballot order effects. Most broadly, psychological theory offers a hypothesis of "primacy effects," whereby the cognitive costs to processing alternatives bias individuals toward earlier choices (Miller and Krosnick, 1998, pp.293-295) .
Stemming from this theory, information salience, such as party labels, the prominence of the office or candidates, and media coverage, is hypothesized to affect the magnitude of ballot order effects.
In a similar, though not necessarily consistent, vein, scholars have also proposed that candidates listed last should benefit from a "recency effect" (Bain and Hecock, 1957) , or that candidates toward the middle of the ballot should be advantaged (Bagley, 1966) . Ballot order effects may also emerge due to the fact that in most states, ballot order is actually informative, as major party candidates are generally listed earlier on the ballot by law.
Yet previous empirical studies disagree sharply over the existence of ballot order effects. Adherents claim that ballot order systematically affects the outcomes of many electoral contests, "[m]ost strikingly...in the highly-publicized and hotly contested presidential race [of 2000]" (Krosnick, Miller and Tichy, 2003, p.52) . Detractors assert that "there is no evidence that there is a ballot position advantage in general elections" (Darcy, 1986, p.649) .
The reason for this lack of consensus in the existing literature may well be methodological. The bulk of previous studies has relied on observational data, in which the name order is not physically randomized. Such analyses necessarily rest on assumptions that are difficult to verify, and their validity may be questioned if any confounding effects, and thereby omitted variable bias, exist.
As outlined in Section 5, the majority of U.S. states arrange the order of candidates on ballots by some partisan or alphabetical rule, making the identification of ballot order effects difficult. In addition, Darcy and McAllister (1990, pp.8-10) finds numerous cases of abuse by elections officials and candidates, who, believing ballot order effects to exist, manipulate the placement of candidates to maximize expected vote share.
Even worse, some studies may not have any evidence on the quantity of interest asserted. In 1975, the California Supreme Court ruled to prohibit listing incumbents first. This decision was largely based on a study that analyzes only non-incumbent elections for the reason that these were the only ones for which ballot order was rotated (Scott, 1972) . Inferences from that study may thereby result in severe extrapolation beyond the bounds of the data if non-incumbent elections systematically differ from elections with incumbents (King and Zeng, 2003) . The best observational research to date examines elections in which candidate names were rotated. Even those studies, however, assume complete randomization without testing it.
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Studies that actually analyze some form of randomized data have found little evidence for ballot order effects (Darcy, 1986; Gold, 1952) . Miller and Krosnick (1998, p.297 ) conclude, after reviewing over 30 articles and books on the subject, that the only studies without design flaws (with randomization) detect no ballot order effects. 2 Yet inferences from such randomized experiments might be limited to unrepresentative samples, such as university students and county fairs (Darcy, 1986) , elections for the anthropological association (Gold, 1952) , and unrealistic lab settings, such as an election with candidates for whom no other information but the name is known (Bagley, 1966) . In response to these problems, Darcy and McAllister (1990, p.5) concludes that "much of the literature is methodologically flawed," while one expert opined that "there is virtually nothing at all [that has] been done on the subject much less anything shown" (Miller and Krosnick, 1998, p.318 ).
To our knowledge, the only study that analyzes randomized name order in real elections is Krosnick, Miller and Tichy (2003) ("KMT"). We extend and improve that study in two principal ways. First, KMT only examines two randomized races from California and one randomized race to address key substantive propositions in the literature. Our dataset also allows us to treat races as repeated natural experiments, yielding inferences with greater precision. This is an important advantage given that the analysis of each election consists only the sample size of 80 assembly districts. Second, we improve the methodology used in KMT's analysis. In particular, we do not impose strict functional form and parametric assumptions to identify the treatment effect. 4 Finally, our conclusions contradict a main claim of KMT that ballot order significantly affects major candidates in general elections, most notably in the presidential election of 2000.
The California Alphabet Lottery
In this section, we first describe the procedure of the California alphabet lottery as mandated by state election law. Second, we conduct statistical tests to show that the alphabets used for 2 One exception to this general experimental finding is Forsythe et al. (1993) . 3 The bulk of the analysis in KMT relies on observational data from Ohio elections, for which randomization is more difficult to verify.
4 KMT used linear regression in its analysis.
5 the elections in the past twenty years are indeed randomly ordered, a crucial assumption of our subsequent analysis.
Lottery Procedure
California election ballots are printed in column-vertical format, depicting the name, party, and occupation of all candidates. Until 1975, California elections law mandated that incumbents appear first on the ballot in the majority of statewide elections (Scott, 1972, p.365) . In 1975, however, the California Supreme Court struck down the provision that reserved the first ballot position to incumbents, and held as unconstitutional, on equal protection grounds, ballot forms that present candidate names in alphabetical order (Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661 (1975) ). The decision relied prominently on studies and testimonies by Bain and Hecock (1957) and Scott (1972) . Scott (1972, p.376) investigated the effect of ballot order using ballot rotations in ten non-incumbent California races. While providing only point estimates of the ballot order effect, the study concluded that "one can attribute at least a five percent increase in the first listed candidate's vote total to a positional bias," a figure that has often been quoted by the Secretary of State since. 5
In response to that decision, the California legislature passed an alphabet randomization procedure to determine the ballot order of candidates. 6 The randomization applies to the national offices of the U.S. Presidency and U.S. Senators, as well as the statewide offices of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Controller, Treasurer, Attorney General, Insurance Commissioner, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The law spells out in precise detail the procedure for drawing a "randomized alphabet":
Each letter of the alphabet shall be written on a separate slip of paper, each of which shall be folded and inserted into a capsule. Each capsule shall be opaque and of uniform weight, color, size, shape, and texture. The capsules shall be placed in a container, which shall be shaken vigorously in order to mix the capsules thoroughly. The container then shall be opened and the capsules removed at random one at a time. As each is removed, it shall be opened and the letter on the slip of paper read aloud and written down. The resulting random order of letters constitutes the randomized alphabet, which is to be used in the same manner as the conventional alphabet in determining the order of all candidates in all elections. For example, if two candidates with the surnames Campbell and Carlson are running for the same office, their order on the ballot will depend on the order in which the letters M and R were drawn in the randomized alphabet drawing (Cal. Elec. Code § 13112(a) (2003)).
5 Bain and Hecock (1957, p.85) (2003)).
The rotation itself is not implemented randomly, which we take into account in our statistical analysis. The procedure nonetheless provides substantial variation of the ballot order, enabling the estimation of candidate-specific ballot order effects. One concern about the California alphabet lottery is that the randomized alphabet may induce behavioral changes of candidates, making it difficult to isolate the direct effects of ballot order on voters. For example, candidates listed last on the ballot in a particular assembly district might campaign more intensely in that district, in fear of some ballot order effect. Or, candidates might be chosen to assure a higher ballot order in favorable districts (Masterman, 1964) . However, such a scenario seems unlikely given that the randomized alphabet is drawn very late in the game.
All but write-in candidates must have declared candidacy and been certified by the time that the drawing of a randomized alphabet takes place, and even sample (non-randomized) ballots are printed before the drawing. Only minor adjustments, such as removal of a candidate from the ballot in the case of a death, occur after the drawing. 9 
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Are Alphabets Really Random?
Election officials seem to have taken seriously their legal obligation of conducting the alphabet lottery. Given the evidence of manipulation of ballot order in other states (e.g., Darcy and McAllister, 1990) , however, we conduct statistical tests to ensure empirically the accurate implementation of the randomization. Such tests often help discover unexpected implementation errors of randomization (Imai, 2004) . As shown in Table 1 , we collected the randomized alphabets used for 23
California statewide elections since 1982. We use this list to test whether the randomization procedure described above has in practice produced completely randomized alphabets not favoring any particular letters, and hence particular candidates.
We conduct a rank test under the null hypothesis that the alphabet is completely randomized.
In particular, we compare the relative positions of all possible pairs of letters by calculating the mean absolute rank differences of paired letters across elections, 1 325
where R(L ik ) denotes a rank or position of the ith letter of the alphabet on the randomized list of the kth election. This statistic averages the relative positions of two distinct letters over 23 elections and all possible such pairs. The resulting sample statistic for the 23 observed alphabets in Table 1 is 2.07, representing the average absolute difference in the relative positions of all possible pairs of distinct letters. Under the null hypothesis of complete randomization, the distribution of this statistic can be calculated exactly by considering all possible lists of alphabet which are equally likely. However, since there are 26! such lists for each election, we approximate this statistic by simulation. We draw 10, 000 lists of 23 randomized alphabets with equal probability, and then calculate the statistic for each list. Finally, we compute the one-tailed p-value by comparing the observed value of the statistic with its simulated values. The resulting one-tailed p-value is 0.15, indicating that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of complete randomization. We also conducted similar randomization tests based on the rank differences between even and odd letters, and letters in the top and bottom half of the true alphabet. Similarly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of complete randomization with one-tailed p-values of 0.27 and 0.30, respectively. In sum, there is no evidence that election officials in California have incorrectly randomized the ballot order.
Causal Effects of Ballot Order
With the aid of the California State Archives and the Statewide Data Base at the University of California, Berkeley, we coded election returns data by assembly districts for a total of 80 statewide races (44 primary races and 36 general races), going back to 1978. Table 2 lists all the races examined in this paper. These include 13 general elections and 8 primaries for 10 statewide offices, yielding a total of 473 candidates analyzed. We also collected the candidate names from which we reconstructed the ballot order for each of these races in each district using the official randomized alphabets. 10
In what follows, we describe our analysis of the California alphabet lottery and present estimated ballot order effects, and such effects conditional on parties, offices, and elections. We first place our analysis in the formal statistical framework of causal inference. Second, we describe our estimation 10 When the official randomized alphabet was not available, we gathered available Assembly District ballots to recover the ballot order. Primary − − 11 8 6 10 11 13 7 4 Table 2 : Number of Candidates Running in All Races Examined. "−" indicates that no election was held for that office in a particular year. Blank cells represent races where election returns data were not available by assembly districts. The number of candidates in this table differs slightly from total number of candidates analyzed because of several uncontested party primaries.
a There were two senatorial elections in 1992 both of which had five candidates running.
strategies and interpret the identification assumptions. Finally, we present our estimates and compare them to the margins of victory observed in the races in order to compute the potential substantive impact on election outcomes if the candidate names were ordered differently.
Causal Inference and Treatment Assignment
We estimate candidate-specific ballot order effects. 11 For each candidate, we observe the randomized (and rotated) ballot order in each of k = 1, . . . , K = 80 districts. That is, we observe the ballot order, the value of the multi-valued treatment variable, T k = t, for all k where t ∈ T = {1, . . . , J}
and J is the total number of candidates in that race. Finally, we also observe candidate's vote share for every district with the corresponding ballot position, denoted by
Our analysis is based on the formal statistical framework for causal inference, frequently referred to as the Rubin causal model (Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986) . In this framework,
is regarded as a set of potential outcomes, T is a set of possible treatment values, and Y k (t) is a random variable that maps a particular treatment, t, to a potential outcome. The fundamental problem of causal inference is that only one realization of potential outcomes for each unit is observed. This means that we do not observe the counterfactual vote shares in a district if the candidates' names on the ballot were ordered differently. Causal inference hence requires estimating these missing potential outcomes.
In the majority of experimental studies, researchers assign treatment to units that are randomly selected with equal probability. We call this common procedure "simple random treatment assignment" with the following definition, Definition 1 (Simple Random Treatment Assignment) From a list of K units, assign a treatment to n units that are randomly selected with an equal probability (without replacement).
In the California alphabet lottery, the randomization procedure is somewhat different since randomization is conducted only for the first Assembly District and the treatment assignments for the other districts are systematically determined thereafter. That is, the randomized ballot order in the first district will be rotated such that in the next district, the candidate in the jth position (j ≥ 2) will be in (j − 1)th position and the candidate in the first position will be placed in the last position, and so on. We call this procedure "systematic random treatment assignment" and 11 We do not pool candidates or races because doing so would introduce omitted variable bias due to candidatespecific or race-specific effects (such as the prominence of the race, and media exposure). Appendix B shows the balance of district-level covariates, which ensures the validity of our candidate-specific analysis.
formally define it as follows, Definition 2 (Systematic Random Treatment Assignment) From a list of K units, assign a treatment to the rth unit, and every Jth unit thereafter. For simplicity, assume that K = nJ, where n is the desired size of a treatment group, J is a positive integer no less than 2, and r is an integer variable randomly drawn with an equal probability from {r : 1 ≤ r ≤ J}.
The names, systematic and simple, come from the fact that these two randomization schemes resemble simple random sampling and systematic sampling in the survey sampling literature (e.g., Cochran, 1977, ch.8) . This connection enables us to apply the results of this literature to our analysis of the California alphabet lottery. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to explicitly draw this connection and to employ results from systematic sampling in the context of causal inference.
Identifying Causal Effects of Ballot Order with Fewer and More Credible Assumptions
To estimate ballot order effects for each candidate, we require two additional assumptions that are typically implicit in conventional estimators. The Rubin causal model enables researchers to interpret these assumptions substantively, and to relax more restrictive assumptions of conventional estimators.
Assumption 1 (No Interference among Units, Rubin (1980) 
where ⊥ ⊥ denotes independence. This assumption is also referred to as stable unit treatment value, and implies that the potential outcome for one unit does not depend on the treatment assignment of another unit (Cox, 1958) . 12 In the case of the California alphabet lottery, this assumption is reasonable when considering candidate-specific effects. 13 However, the assumption is violated in an analysis that pools candidates, typical in this literature: since candidate vote shares in one district must sum to 1, a ballot order effect on one candidate necessarily affects the remaining candidates. 14 Hence, we estimate effects separately for each candidate, which relaxes pooling 12 In addition, the stable unit treatment value assumption asserts that there are no differing version of the treatment.
This means that changes in ballot order are the same across Assembly Districts, and could be violated if ballots differed dramatically across districts. 13 For a purely nonparametric approach in the context of the California Recall, see . 14 One potential solution to this interference would be to explicitly model all candidates' vote shares at the same time as a function of their ballot positions by, for example, a multinomial logit model. There are substantial disadvantages 13 assumptions in extant studies that are known to be violated and permits us to estimate differential effects for different party candidates.
The second assumption is essential for unbiased estimation of treatment effects and is satisfied by simple random assignment of Definition 1.
where I(·) represents an indicator function. It is straightforward to show that systematic random assignment of the California alphabet lottery (Definition 2) also satisfies this assumption since the ballot order is independent of potential outcomes. In Appendix B, we further empirically test this assumption by examining the balance of observable covariates from Census and registration data.
There is no evidence that the assumption is violated, which means that accounting for covariates will not affect point estimates, and if anything will only lead to more precise estimates. Moreover, covariates that are typically included in the literature are race and candidate specific covariates, which we automatically control for by virtue of estimating candidate-specific effects.
Assumptions 1 and 2 suffice to identify the average ballot order effect for each candidate from the observed data with uniformly fewer assumptions than commonly imposed in the literature.
Specifically, it is straightforward to show that the average treatment effect for candidate j, τ ≡
, t with t = t , can be estimated without bias,
where Y (s) ≡ k∈{k:T k =s} Y k (s)/n s and n s is the number of assembly districts where the candidate is assigned to the sth ballot position.
Although an unbiased estimate of the average ballot effect is readily available, the variance calculation of this estimator is not straightforward. This is because systematic random assignment, unlike simple random assignment, involves only one randomization. In Appendix A, we discuss the details of our variance identification strategy, which adapts an auxiliary variable strategy of choosing the best variance estimators for a systematic sample (Wolter, 1984 
Estimated Causal Effects of Ballot Order
We report two primary quantities of interest: (a) the average absolute gain for each candidate due confidence intervals, using the minimum MSE variance estimator (see Appendix A). For 28 out of the 68 candidates there are significant effects for which the confidence intervals do not intersect zero. The median gain was roughly 10% of the baseline vote share. On the other hand, almost all of these estimates stem from minor party candidates, as seen by the fact that major party candidate estimates for Democrats and Republicans, signified by the dark thin bars, are concentrated in the bottom half of the ordering. Indeed, third party candidates have a median gain score of roughly 17%, whereas major party candidates had a relative gain of roughly 1%. In terms of absolute gains, however, the estimates are relatively small for general elections, with a median gain of roughly 0.2% of the total vote.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 presents the estimated average relative gains for the 1998 and 2000 primary elections. 16 The magnitude of the effects is substantially larger than in general elections. 
General Election 1998 & 2000
Candidates ( 
Primary Elections, 1998 & 2000
Candidates (ordered in magnitude of gain)
Relative % Gain of First Position1.6% of the party vote. Given that primary races have a much larger number of candidates, it is notable that the absolute gain is larger than for general elections (see also Section 4.4).
Averaging over all the races from 1978 to 1992, Table 3 summarizes the estimated ballot effects for these 25 years. 17 The rough patterns of the 1998 and 2000 elections hold across all elections studied. In general elections, major party candidates exhibit no discernible ballot order effect, while the effect on minor party candidates is substantial. Minor party candidates typically gain from 15 to 30% of their baseline vote share in general elections. Given that minor party candidates generally receive only a small proportion of the vote, however, this amounts to an average absolute gain of roughly 0.2 to 0.6% of the total vote cast.
Testable propositions deriving from partisan cue theory would predict that cognitive biases such as ballot effects should be most prominent for nonpartisan races, independent candidates, and primary races, since party labels are least informative in such races. These predictions bear out consistently in our results. Independent and nonpartisan candidates gain 2.4% of the absolute vote share when listed first, and when the office itself is nonpartisan, candidates gain roughly 3.3% of the total vote share when in first. This magnitude difference is consistent with the notion that more information about candidate policy preferences is conveyed in races where at least some candidates are partisans. On the other hand, since the only nonpartisan office in our dataset is the Superintendent of Education, we cannot determine whether larger cognitive biases might stem from lack of partisan labels, lower prominence of the office, or both.
In primaries, where the least information is conveyed by party affiliation, ballot order affects all Given that partisan labels are relatively uninformative in primaries, where there are often multiple party candidates running, this result is not surprising in light of partisan cue theory.
Tables 4 and 5 present estimated average absolute and relative gains broken down by office and party, respectively. In both general and primary elections, no discernible patterns emerge with respect to the prominence of the office, or to the order in which the office appears on the ballot.
General Elections
Party P r e s i d e n t S e n a t e G o v e r n o r L t . G o v . A t t y G e n l C o n t r o l l e r I n s . C o m m . S e c . S t a t e T r e a s u r e r S u p t E d u c Table 3 , all candidate-specific effects are averaged over different elections to obtain the overall average effect for each office and party.
In general elections, no discernible patterns emerge with respect to the prominence of the office, or to the order in which the office appears on the ballot. In primary elections, ballot order effects are sometimes larger for major offices. In both cases, nonpartisan candidates for the Superintendent of Education are significantly affected by ballot order. Table 3 , all candidate-specific effects are averaged over different elections to obtain the overall average effect for each office and party. In general elections, no discernible patterns emerge with respect to the prominence of the office, or to the order in which the office appears on the ballot. In primary elections, ballot order effects are sometimes larger for major offices. In both cases, nonpartisan candidates for the Superintendent of Education are significantly affected by ballot order.
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Primary Elections
Party P r e s i d e n t S e n a t e G o v e r n o r L t . G o v . A t t y G e n l C o n t r o l l e r I n s . C o m m . S e c . S t a t e T r e a s u r e r S u p t E d u c
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The only exception is the Superintendent of Education, which is a nonpartisan race.
Appendix C presents a host of other conditional effects and yields further insight into various behavioral models of ballot order effects. First, one might expect ballot order effects to be smaller in non-incumbent races, since incumbency may act as an informational cue to voters. Incumbents are denoted on California ballots, which provide current employment descriptions for all candidates.
While we find few differences for incumbent and open races in general elections, in primaries open seat races appear to be associated with larger ballot order effects (see Table 9 ). Second, we test the degree to which ballot order effects are driven by small uninformed groups of voters who turn out only for the prominent races. We do this by examining on-year versus off-year (or midterm)
elections. Since contested offices differ in on-year and off-year elections with the exception of US Senate elections, we examine Senate results. The finding shows that the ballot order effect for on-year elections is generally larger (see Table 10 ). In particular, Democratic candidates in on-year general elections gain roughly two percentage points when listed first, while exhibiting no gains at all in off-year elections.
Lastly, we investigate the magnitude of ballot order effects conditional on the number of candidates. This addresses two competing behavioral models of ballot order effects, one positing that evaluating each additional candidate entails some cognitive cost, and the other positing that the first positions solves a coordination problem between voters (e.g., Forsythe et al., 1993; Mebane, 2000) . The cognitive cost model implies monotonically increasing ballot effects in the number of candidates, while the latter provides a unclear prediction when the number of candidates is greater than two. We find that ballot order effects roughly increase monotonically in the number of candidates, lending credence to the cognitive cost model (see Table 11 ).
Margin of Victory and Ballot Order Effect
To get a sense of the substantive size of these estimated effects, Figure 3 plots the estimated ballot order effect of the second-highest vote-getter of each race against the margin of victory. The margin of victory is defined as the difference in vote shares between the winner and the second-highest vote-getter in a race. 18 Thick confidence intervals indicate that they include or exceed the margin of victory. The figure underscores the fact that the substantive effect of ballot order on election outcomes hinges largely on how close the races are. In general elections, as suggested by our previous results, we find no conclusive evidence of ballot order effects on major candidates. In 18 Note that for primaries, we define a race here as a competition for the nomination for the party nomination. 
Policy Implications for Ballot Reform
If one of the primary goals of election law is to provide equal opportunity to candidates, our findings suggest that election officials may want to randomize the name order of candidates on ballots and minimize ballot order effects. In short, unlike some prescriptions drawn from behavioral studies, ours demonstrates a clear solution to remove bias in social choice (Jolls and Sunstein, 2004) . In this section, we first outline the costs and benefits of randomization. Second, we conduct a costeffectiveness analysis and show that randomization of ballot order is more cost-effective at reducing election day bias than currently proposed voting reforms by more than a factor of 100. The basic intuition is that since randomization requires no substantial financing of new voting equipment, it is by far the most cost-effective way to reduce voting bias. Lastly, we examine the range of statutes governing ballot order across the fifty states to suggest potential avenues of reform. Surveying ballot statutes in all the fifty states reveals that these rules are typically employed to advantage
major parties in what we may describe as an anti-competitive partisan lockup (Issacharoff and Pildes, 1998).
Cost and Benefits of Randomization
The primary benefit of randomization lies in improving the fairness of elections. 19 Randomization would improve the fairness of elections for major and minor parties alike. Our study shows that non-random ballot order disproportionately benefits one candidate in virtually all primaries. While in general elections randomization is unlikely to change outcomes, in twelve percent of primary races examined, ballot order might have changed the winner of the race. Randomization would therefore help all parties, including the Democratic and Republican parties, nominate the most preferred candidates for the general election.
That said, various randomization methods differ in the effectiveness of reducing ballot order effects. Statistical theory clearly predicts that the bias of ballot order effects will decrease in the number of units across which the ballot is randomized. To truly reduce ballot order effects to zero, states may want to conduct randomization across smaller units, such as counties or precincts. In the future, the advancement of electronic voting technology might even allow the name order of candidates to be randomized separately for each individual voter. On the other hand, in practice, randomizing across every precinct, or every voter, may not be feasible. We therefore suggest principal cost criteria by which states might decide how to implement cost-effective randomization.
The costs of randomization are fourfold. First, election officials may incur the administrative costs in conducting a randomized drawing of the ballot order. This includes concerns over added complexity of randomization and the risk of mistakes in electoral administration. With the aid of modern computer technology, however, the cost of drawing a random alphabet itself is minor. To make this process transparent, administrative costs may additionally entail publicizing the event,
as in California (see Section 3.1). Second, election officials may incur marginal printing costs for randomized ballots. This presents a tradeoff: as the number of randomizations increases, ballot order effects decrease but printing costs increase. On the other hand, precincts and counties already print out specific versions of ballots due to local offices and issues. California, for example, currently prints roughly 18,000 styles of ballots for a general election and over 25,000 styles for primaries. 20
As a result, the marginal printing costs of randomization are relatively small. In fact, as we show in Section 5.2, these printing costs are miniscule compared to all existing voting reform efforts.
The third cost is in voter confusion. Some argue that alphabetical or partisan ballots permit voters to locate their preferred candidate more efficiently than randomized ballots. Randomization might also disproportionately harm some parties over others. Candidates, for example, could no longer campaign on specific ballot positions (e.g., "Vote No. 3 on the Ballot") and voting a straight party tickets may be more difficult. Yet we find that the magnitude of ballot order effects Lastly, randomization may entail costs in governmental stability. This is premised on the argument that a government objective of promoting stability may reasonably justify listing majoritarian parties and incumbents first. This rationale is most directly at odds with the fairness benefit of randomization. Further, the argument for partisan orders does not apply directly to primaries, where major parties are often nominating candidates within their own party. And the argument for incumbency was explicitly refuted by the California Supreme Court, which "emphatically reject[ed] the notion that the government may consciously choose to favor the election of incumbents over non-incumbents . . . distort[ing] the preferences of participating voters" (Gould v. Grubb, at 673). Based on the above tradeoffs, states will have to decide whether to adopt and how to implement randomization. Next, we show that current reform efforts that focus largely on voting equipment appear inconsistent with a principle of cost-effective reduction of voting bias. c The magnitude of bias is based on the estimated undervote rate reported by US General Accounting Office (2001). The undervote rates for optical scans and electronic voting machines are 1.32 and 1.59%, respectively. For example, switching from punch cards to optical scan would reduce the undervote rate by about 1.35 percentage points. The cost calculation is based on the estimates reported by Caltech and MIT Voting Technology Project (2001, p.52). For example, the report estimated the costs of updating the old equipments to optical scan and electronic voting machine to be $0.60 and $1.40, respectively for every voter. Hence, the marginal costs of reducing one biased vote with optical scans, for example, equals 0.60/0.0135. Cost figures are marginal cost estimates, assuming equipment acquisition costs are borne over the equipment's lifespan.
The Cost-Effectiveness of Randomization
marginal cost of printing different ballots to provide conservative estimates. Specifically, we use an estimated cost of randomizing across Assembly Districts that is given by a California County Registrar of Voters as well as the estimated marginal cost of randomization across cities and towns that is given by New Hampshire Secretary of State Office. 22 To obtain the dollar amount necessary to reduce voting bias by one vote, we divide the marginal costs over the estimated number of voters who voted for the first candidate solely due to ballot order.
We estimate that California spends roughly 20 to 40 cents to eliminate a biased vote due to ballot order. 23 When the units of randomization are small, the cost is higher: New Hampshire will spend 23 Note that "elimination" here should be interpreted as uniformly distributing votes that are determined by ballot about $7 to eliminate one biased vote if they decide to randomize ballot order by town and cities.
The second column of Table 6 gives the estimates of undervote rate for different voting machines in use, which are based on the report by US General Accounting Office (2001 , Table 1 ). Again, as in the calculation of the cost-effectiveness of randomization, we use these figures to calculate the dollar amount spent to eliminate one biased vote, where a biased vote is defined for voting equipment as a vote that remains uncounted solely due to voting equipment. For example, switching from punch cards to optical scan would reduce the undervote rate by about 1.35 percentage points.
Given the cost of obtaining new equipment amortized over the equipment lifetime, this amounts to approximately $44 for optical scans and $130 for electronic voting machines. Table 6 clearly demonstrates the relative cost-effectiveness in reducing voting bias of randomization. While states may spend anywhere from $40 to $470 to reduce the bias of one hanging chad, less than a dollar could be invested to reduce the bias of ballot order by randomizing across units that are size of California Assembly Districts. Although our estimates do not account for other dimensions of benefits and costs of reforms and are based only on rough estimates, the basic reason for the relative cost-effectives of randomization is transparent: equipment reform entails large acquisition costs of expensive machines, whereas randomization does not. Our analysis strongly suggests that the focus of current reform efforts can be altered to achieve more cost-effective voting reform.
Existing Policies and Possible Reforms
Depending on how states choose to address the tradeoff in costs and benefits of randomization, many potential areas and intermediate steps for reform may exist. Table 7 Randomized separately in each of 53 counties, and then rotated through precinct ordered by total votes cast for governor in the last election ballot order, namely partisan, alphabetical, and randomized types.
Twenty-eight states adopt partisan rules that may introduce the largest bias due to ballot order.
Partisan rules hold that incumbents, major party candidates, or candidates with the largest vote shares in previous elections be listed first. 25 Connecticut is representative of these states, providing that the "names of the parties shall be arranged" by the order of "[t]he party whose candidate for Governor polled the highest number of votes in the last-preceding election" (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-6-121 (2003) . 25 We also include discretionary statutes of Idaho and Mississippi that allow the Secretary of State to determine the ballot order in this category, since it vests power in incumbents to determine the order. Other states that are classified as alphabetical types, such as Alabama, also alphabetize party names first, so the typology distinguishing between primarily partisan and alphabetical types may not be entirely clearcut. Roughly 10 states already employ some form of randomization to determine the ballot order.
While this substantially reduces bias across elections, the majority of these states, after one randomization, maintain the same ballot order in any particular election. Hence, for each election, the candidate randomly selected to be listed first still reaps substantial benefits of ballot order.
To reduce bias further, states may want to consider randomizations across smaller units, such as counties or precincts, and/or randomization of candidates, rather than the alphabet.
Only two states, California and North Dakota, employ randomization with different ballot orders across subunits of the states for general elections, thereby providing the smallest bias due to the ballot order effect among existing election practices. Nonetheless, even in these two states, there is room for improvement in reducing ballot effects. Just like the alphabetical rotational scheme, California's rotational rule may produce a relative advantage of one candidate over another in any given race. 27 Randomization across many subunits without rotation therefore might further reduce bias resulting from ballot order.
In sum, if states choose to minimize ballot bias, they have much potential to improve. The vast majority of states employ rules that systematically favor a two-party duopoly. The good news is 26 Ohio, for example, prints ballots in alphabetical order in the first precinct and for "each succeeding precinct, the name in each group that is listed first in the preceding precinct shall be listed last, and the name of each candidate shall be moved up one place" Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3505.03 (Anderson 2003) . 27 Even in North Dakota, where randomization is conducted separately within each of the 53 counties, the precincts across which ballots are rotated are arranged in the order of total votes cast for governor in the last election.
29 that even small steps towards complete randomization, such as rotation or one-shot randomization, are likely to drastically reduce ballot order effects, at a cost that appears to be substantially lower and more effective than many other areas of ballot reform.
Concluding Remarks
Our analysis of the California alphabet lottery from 1978 to 2002 provides one detailed case study of the effects of partisan control of electoral regulation. In the majority of states, legislatures appear to have exploited voter biases to entrench status quo candidates. This case study suggests a clear prescriptive and cost-effective solution to reduce the effects of voter cognitive bias and improve fairness in elections. We also place the study of ballot order effects on solid empirical ground, avoiding the external validity problems of laboratory experiments and the potential biases of observational studies. The results of this study are largely consistent with theories emphasizing the importance of informational cues. We detect the largest ballot effects, when voters lack partisan labels on ballots, as in nonpartisan races, or when those labels cannot distinguish between multiple candidates, as in primary races.
Appendix
A Identification of Variance
The population variance of the estimated average ballot order effectτ in equation 2 is the sum of the variances for the two potential outcomes, i.e.,
Using the result from the systematic sampling literature (e.g., Madow and Madow, 1944) , for s = t, t with t = t each of the two variances is
where σ 2 s is the population variance of Y k (s). ρ s is the intraclass correlation coefficient between pairs of potential outcomes within the same systematic sample and is given by where Y * lm (s) denotes the potential vote share in the mth district in the lth systematic sample (for the candidate and under the sth ballot position). ρ s represents a measure of the homogeneity of each potential outcome within a sample averaging over the J possible treatment assignment combinations. Unfortunately, V (τ ) cannot be consistently estimated without making some assumptions about the population since we only observe one systematic random sample of the treatment assignment combination.
Nevertheless, the expression of V (τ ) from equation 3 has a useful interpretation. If ρ s = 0, the variance is the same as that for simple random assignment. When ρ s < 0, we have a heterogeneous sample that is more representative of the population and the variance is lower than that of simple random assignment. For example, suppose that Y k (s) is monotonically increasing in k as in the left panel in Figure 4 . Systematic random assignment ensures that we obtain units across the whole range of k, whereas simple random assignment does not. In the figure, the circles representing simple random assignment are centered toward the lower end of the vote share, whereas systematic random assignment is evenly distributed across the assembly districts. On the other hand, when ρ s > 0, we have a homogeneous sample, and thereby the variance of the estimator is greater than that of simple random assignment. The most pathological case is one of periodicity that coincides with J, as shown in the right panel of Figure 4 . In that case, simple random assignment is more efficient, since it ensures sampling units that are along any part of the wave-like pattern of the population. Systematic random assignment, however, samples only those assembly districts with low vote shares, since the periodicity coincides almost exactly with J.
Given this nature of systematic random assignment, we estimate the variance based on different assumptions about the population. In particular, we consider the following four types of variance estimators for V { Y (s)} developed in the literature (e.g., Wolter, 1984) . They are based on the population models with random order, linear trend, stratification, and autocorrelation.
where f = n s /K is the finite population correction andp s = k∈{k:
A few remarks about each estimator are worthwhile. First, V rand assumes that assembly districts are randomly ordered. While V line is designed to eliminate a linear trend by taking successive differences, V strat assumes that the mean of the potential vote shares is constant within each stratum of J districts. Finally, V auto is based on the autocorrelated population model where the correlation of two potential vote shares depends only on the difference in their assembly district number.
Given that we do not know which of these candidate estimators best approximates the true variance of the potential vote shares, we employ an auxiliary variable approach advocated in the systematic sampling literature to select the estimator. Since party registration is known to be one of the best predictors for a candidate's actual vote share in an election, it provides an ideal auxiliary variable. We evaluate the performance of the four estimators using party registration data for each election. 29 For any party and number of candidates running in a particular race, we can then calculate how the estimators perform across all possible systematic samples compared to known true variance of party registration. 30 29 If official registration data was unavailable for a particular election, we used registration data from the closest election.
30 For closed primary races, this approach may not be appropriate since party registrants are the only eligible voters. Thus, we conducted sensitivity analyses using both the random list and minimum MSE estimators.
Given this auxiliary variable, we select the variance estimator that performed best in terms of mean squared error (MSE) criteria to estimate the variance of ballot order effects. For the 1998 and 2000 general elections, for example, among 66 candidates considered, 47% of the time the minimum MSE is the random list estimator and 33% of the time it is the autocorrelation estimator. The median variance bias among the selected estimators is 0.4%, and the variance bias ranges from −25% (5 percentile) to 35% (95 percentile). Interestingly, assuming a random list is generally conservative for California, since the intra-class correlation coefficient for all parties is negative at observed J. This is consistent with the registration patterns across Assembly Districts in California as seen in Figure 1 , with more liberal urban districts clustered in the North and in Los Angeles, but generally more conservative districts in the South.
B Assessing Balance of Covariates
While randomization balances covariates in expectation across repeated experiments, in any given sample covariates might still remain imbalanced. In particular, systematic treatment assignment is susceptible to trends such as periodicity in the population, since randomization occurs only once per race. As a result, checking the balance of Assembly Districts in any one particular race remains a crucial test for the validity of inferences. major potential confounding variables such as gender, race, education, income, urbanization, unemployment, industry, poverty levels, and party registration for the major seven parties recognized in California. Since for each j, there are j possible treatment assignments, this yields 1, 122 = 34× j means tests. Figure 5 compares these t-statistics with the quantiles of the t-distribution with appropriate degrees of freedom. Under simple random assignment, we expect the distribution of the test statistics to approximate a t-distribution. The statistics are overwhelmingly bounded by the shaded 95% intervals, indicating that there is relative balance across all observed treatment assignments. In fact, in the case of small number of candidates, the covariate balance appears to be even better than under simple random assignment. As the number of candidates increases, balance decreases, as indicated by the few outliers for the 8 candidate panel, although the distribution still generally follows a t-distribution. All together, the analysis of this section shows no evidence of incomplete randomization.
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